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Abstract: 
In this paper we examine the sustainability of euro area public finances against the 
backdrop of population ageing. We critically assess the widely used projections of the 
Working Group on Ageing Populations (AWG) of the EU's Economic Policy 
Committee and argue that ageing costs may be higher than projected in the AWG 
reference scenario. Taking into account adjusted headline estimates for ageing costs, 
largely based upon the sensitivity analysis carried out by the AWG, we consider 
alternative indicators to quantify sustainability gaps for euro area countries. With 
respect to the policy implications, we assess the appropriateness of different budgetary 
strategies to restore fiscal sustainability taking into account intergenerational equity. 
Our stylised analysis based upon the lifetime contribution to the government's primary 
balance of different generations suggests that an important degree of pre-funding of the 
ageing costs is necessary to avoid shifting the burden of adjustment in a 
disproportionate way to future generations. For many euro area countries this implies 
that the medium-term targets defined in the context of the revised stability and growth 
pact would ideally need to be revised upwards to significant surpluses. 
Keywords: H55,  H60 
JEL-Classification:  population ageing, fiscal sustainability, generational accounting, 
medium-term objectives for fiscal policy  
 
Non technical summary 
Population ageing poses important challenges for policymakers in the coming decades. 
Increasing outlays for pension, health and elderly care systems will weigh on 
government budgets while economic growth is projected to decline due to the gradually 
decreasing population of working age. At the Stockholm European Council in 2001 a 
three-pronged strategy was formulated to deal with those challenges. It consists of 
structural reforms to pension and care systems, measures to increase employment and 
economic growth and fiscal consolidation. In this paper we focus on the latter element 
and we examine the issue of fiscal sustainability in euro area countries, i.e. the extent to 
which current fiscal policies can be continued or will have to be adjusted. 
We first carry out a critical assessment of the widely-used estimates of the budgetary 
impact of population ageing by the European Policy Committee's Working Group on 
Population Ageing. According to this Working Group's most recent estimates ageing 
would worsen budget balances by around 4.3% of GDP in the 2010-2050 period in the 
eleven countries that initially formed the euro area in 1999. However, such long-term 
projections are obviously surrounded with significant uncertainties. Using plausible 
alternative estimates for key parameters in the Working Group's projections, largely 
based upon sensitivity analyses carried out by this Working Group, we find that ageing 
costs in the 2010-2050 period may be 1 percentage point higher. 
Against this background, we look at a range of fiscal sustainability indicators and 
calculate sustainability gaps taking into account the modified ageing costs. We find that, 
of all the countries considered in this paper, public finances currently only appear to be 
sustainable in Finland. All other countries will have to adjust their fiscal policies sooner 
or later. The exact size of the sustainability gaps differs according to the indicator 
chosen but the ranking of the countries is more robust. The required adjustment effort is 
much smaller for countries that have recently implemented important structural reforms 
to their pension systems such as Germany, Austria and Italy.  
Sustainability indicators such as the ones considered in this paper typically measure the 
size of an 'early' adjustment effort to restore fiscal sustainability. In many cases, this  
 
early adjustment effort would imply very important consolidation measures in the 
coming years. In this paper we propose to analyse the appropriateness of such a 
budgetary strategy on the basis of an intergenerational equity criterion. The method that 
is used to make this criterion operational is close to a classical generational accounting 
approach but differs from it in a number of specific aspects. By attributing government 
revenue and primary expenditure to different age cohorts, we calculate a 'net tax burden' 
for different generations. We then compare the evolution of this net tax burden for two 
different budgetary strategies, an early adjustment effort aimed at restoring fiscal 
sustainability in the coming years already and a more gradual fiscal adjustment spread 
over the 2010-2050 period. We show for three euro area countries - Belgium, Germany 
and France - that the earlier fiscal adjustment effort leads to a somewhat flatter profile 
for the net tax burden across age cohorts: the burden is higher for younger and future 
generations but the increase is generally less steep than under the more gradual 
adjustment effort. Hence, an earlier fiscal adjustment, i.e. 'pre-funding' (a large part of) 
the ageing costs via fiscal consolidation in the coming years can in our view be 
considered more equitable. 
Our calculations of the fiscal burden across age cohorts are partly based upon a number 
of simplifying assumptions. This pertains for example to the age profiles for specific 
government revenue and expenditure items and the macroeconomic environment which 
does not include any feedback effects from the budgetary strategies. However, 
sensitivity analysis shows that the main result - a pre-funding approach is more 
equitable than a gradual fiscal adjustment - is quite robust to changes in these 
assumptions. 
While the paper does not provide any insights on which policy mix, e.g. structural 
reforms vs. budgetary pre-funding, is the optimal response to population ageing, its 
main conclusion seems relevant against the background of the developments in the EU 
fiscal rules. The ECOFIN Council has indeed recently indicated that long-term fiscal 
sustainability, notably the future impact of ageing, is to be better taken into account in 
the definition of the medium-term objectives  for fiscal policy introduced in the context 
of the revised stability and growth pact. In this connection, concerns for 
intergenerational equity could play a role and could be made operational along the lines 
suggested here. If our tentative conclusions were confirmed and if no further cost- 
 
cutting reforms to pension and care systems are implemented, an upward revision of the 
medium-term objectives to significant surpluses may then be warranted for many EU 
Member States.  
 
Nicht technische Zusammenfassung 
Die Alterung der Bevölkerung stellt die Politiker in den kommenden Jahrzehnten vor 
große Herausforderungen. Steigende Ausgaben für Renten-, Gesundheits- und 
Altenpflegesysteme werden die Staatshaushalte belasten, während das 
Wirtschaftswachstum aufgrund der allmählich abnehmenden Bevölkerung im 
erwerbsfähigen Alter sinken dürfte. Der Europäische Rat von Stockholm formulierte 
2001 eine dreigleisige Strategie zur Bewältigung dieser Herausforderungen. Sie besteht 
aus strukturellen Reformen der Alterssicherungs- und Pflegesysteme, Maßnahmen zur 
Förderung von Beschäftigung und Wirtschaftswachstum sowie der 
Haushaltskonsolidierung. In der vorliegenden Studie konzentrieren wir uns auf das 
letztgenannte Element und untersuchen die Tragfähigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen in 
den Ländern des Euro-Währungsgebiets, d. h. die Frage, ob und inwieweit die 
bestehende Haushaltspolitik angepasst werden muss. 
Zunächst unterziehen wir die häufig zitierten Schätzungen der Arbeitsgruppe 
„Alterung“ des Ausschusses für Wirtschaftspolitik der Europäischen Union zu den 
Auswirkungen der Bevölkerungsalterung auf die Staatshaushalte einer kritischen 
Beurteilung. Den jüngsten Schätzungen dieser Arbeitsgruppe zufolge werden sich die 
staatlichen Defizit- bzw. Überschussquoten der elf Länder, die sich 1999 zum Euro-
Währungsgebiets zusammenschlossen, im Zeitraum von 2010 bis 2050 um rund 4,3 
Prozentpunkte verschlechtern. Projektionen auf so lange Sicht sind naturgemäß mit 
erheblichen Unsicherheiten behaftet. Gestützt auf Sensitivitätsanalysen der 
Arbeitsgruppe und plausible Alternativannahmen der in den Projektionen gewählten 
zentralen Parameter kommen wir zu dem Schluss, dass die fiskalischen Kosten der 
Bevölkerungsalterung im Zeitraum 2010 bis 2050 um 1 Prozentpunkt höher liegen 
könnten.  
Vor diesem Hintergrund betrachten wir eine Reihe von Indikatoren für die 
Tragfähigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen und berechnen – unter Berücksichtigung der 
modifizierten Haushaltsbelastung – Tragfähigkeitslücken. Demnach scheinen von den 
hier untersuchten Ländern nur die öffentlichen Finanzen Finnlands langfristig tragfähig 
zu sein. Alle anderen Länder werden ihre Haushaltspolitik früher oder später anpassen  
 
müssen. Der genaue Umfang der Tragfähigkeitslücke hängt von dem gewählten 
Indikator ab, doch die Rangfolge der Länder wird dadurch kaum beeinflusst. Die 
erforderliche Anpassung ist für Länder wie Deutschland, Österreich und Italien, die in 
ihren Alterssicherungssystemen vor Kurzem bedeutende Strukturreformen durchgeführt 
haben, vergleichsweise gering.  
Tragfähigkeitsindikatoren messen in der Regel den Umfang einer „frühzeitigen“ 
Anpassung zur Wiederherstellung der Tragfähigkeit des Haushalts. In vielen Fällen 
würde eine solche Anpassung bedeuten, dass in den kommenden Jahren ausgesprochen 
umfangreiche Konsolidierungsmaßnahmen vorgenommen werden müssten. In der 
vorliegenden Untersuchung analysieren wir auf Basis des Kriteriums der 
intergenerativen Verteilung, inwieweit eine solche Haushaltsstrategie angemessen ist. 
Um dieses Kriterium anwenden zu können, wird eine Methode benutzt, die der 
klassischen Generationenbilanzierung ähnelt, sich von dieser aber in einigen Aspekten 
unterscheidet. Durch die Zuordnung der Staatseinnahmen und Primärausgaben zu 
verschiedenen Alterskohorten berechnen wir die „Nettosteuerbelastung“ für 
verschiedene Generationen über ihre Lebenszeit. Dann vergleichen wir die Entwicklung 
dieser Nettosteuerbelastung unter zwei verschiedenen Haushaltsstrategien. Die erste 
Strategie ist die  einer frühzeitigen Anpassung mit dem Ziel, die Tragfähigkeit der 
öffentlichen Finanzen bereits in den kommenden Jahren wiederherzustellen. Die zweite 
Strategie ist die einer langsameren Haushaltsanpassung, die sich über den Zeitraum 
2010 bis 2050 erstreckt. Für die drei untersuchten Ländern des Euroraums – Belgien, 
Deutschland und Frankreich – ergibt sich, dass die frühzeitige Haushaltsanpassung über 
die Alterskohorten hinweg zu einem etwas flacheren zeitlichen Profil der 
Nettosteuerbelastungen führt: Die Belastung fällt für die jüngeren und künftigen 
Generationen zwar höher aus, aber im Allgemeinen ist der Anstieg sanfter als unter der 
Strategie einer langsameren Anpassung. Somit führt eine frühzeitige 
Haushaltsanpassung, d. h. die „Vorfinanzierung“ (eines großen Teils) der Kosten der 
Bevölkerungsalterung über eine Haushaltskonsolidierung in den kommenden Jahren, zu 
einer intergenerativ gleichmäßigeren Verteilung der Belastungen. 
Unsere über die Alterskohorten hinweg angestellten Berechnungen der 
Haushaltsbelastungen stützen sich auf einige vereinfachende Annahmen (beispielsweise 
im Hinblick auf altersspezifische Profile für bestimmte Posten der Staatseinnahmen und  
 
-ausgaben). Sensitivitätsanalysen zeigen jedoch, dass sich das wichtigste Ergebnis – 
eine ausgewogenere intergenerative Lastenverteilung bei frühzeitiger Anpassung – 
gegenüber Veränderungen dieser Annahmen als ziemlich robust erweist. Die Studie 
befasst sich aber nicht mit der Frage, welcher Policy-Mix (z. B. Strukturreformen oder 
Vorfinanzierung über den Haushalt) die optimale Reaktion auf die 
Bevölkerungsalterung darstellt. 
Die zentrale Schlussfolgerung der Untersuchung ist relevant für die weitere 
Entwicklung der finanzpolitischen Regeln in der EU. So wies der ECOFIN-Rat vor 
Kurzem darauf hin, dass im Einklang mit dem 2005 geänderten Stabilitäts- und 
Wachstumspakt die langfristige Tragfähigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen - insbesondere 
die künftigen Auswirkungen der Bevölkerungsalterung - bei der Festlegung der 
mittelfristigen Haushaltsziele stärker berücksichtigt werden sollte. In diesem 
Zusammenhang könnte das Kriterium der intergenerativen Verteilung eine Rolle spielen 
und wie hier vorgeschlagen operationalisiert werden. Sollten sich unsere vorläufigen 
Schlussfolgerungen bestätigen, könnte es für viele EU-Mitgliedstaaten angeraten sein, 
ihre mittelfristigen Haushaltsziele nach oben zu revidieren und einen beträchtlichen 
Überschuss anzustreben, sofern keine weiteren kostensenkenden Reformen der 
Alterssicherungs- und Pflegesysteme erfolgen.  
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Fiscal sustainability and policy implications  
for the euro area
* 
Introduction 
Populations are ageing rapidly in nearly all EU Member States, due to gradually 
increasing life expectancy, the baby-boom baby-bust cycle observed in the second half 
of the last century and a long-run trend towards low birth rates. Awareness of the 
potentially very important macroeconomic and budgetary implications of these 
demographic changes has increased in recent years. Authorities now routinely try to 
gauge the impact of population ageing on the sustainability of public finances and 
increasingly take into account the findings of these studies when defining their 
economic policies. In this connection, a three-pronged strategy was formulated at the 
Stockholm European Council in 2001. It entails a rapid reduction of public debt, an 
increase in employment and productivity and reforms to existing pension, health and 
long-term care systems. Policy responses should obviously comply with all relevant EU 
fiscal rules and be tailored to restore fiscal sustainability in a timely manner. 
With respect to the budgetary pillar of that three-pronged strategy and in 
accordance with the Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council of 9 October 2007, long-term 
fiscal sustainability, notably the future impact of ageing, is to be better taken into 
account in the definition of the medium-term objectives (MTOs) for fiscal policy 
introduced in the context of the revised stability and growth pact. One of the key 
questions in this respect is to what extent future ageing-related expenditure should be 
pre-funded by attaining high primary surpluses in the coming years. 
This paper does not provide any insights on which policy mix, e.g. structural 
reforms vs. budgetary pre-funding, is the optimal response to population ageing. It 
simply wants to contribute to the debate on the appropriate timing of the budgetary 
component of the response to population ageing - and the definition of 'ageing-
                                                 
*  The authors would like to thank Maximilian Baylor, Louis Bê Duc, Didier Blanchet, Francisco de 
Castro Fernández, Johannes Clemens, Krisztina Karagyozova, Helvi Kinnunen, Nadine Leiner-
Killinger, Richard Morris, Olegs Tkacevs, Kris Van Cauter, Karsten Wendorff, and several colleagues 
from the European System of Central Banks for very helpful comments and discussions and Muriel 
Bouchet, Cláudia Rodrigues Braz, Francisco de Castro Fernández, Helvi Kinnunen, Nadine Leiner-
Killinger and Diarmaid Smyth for their contributions to the country fiches in the Annex. 
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augmented' MTOs in particular - keeping all other things equal. We specifically analyse 
the relative merits of an 'early' fiscal adjustment (implying a strong fiscal tightening for 
many countries in the following years) and a more gradual fiscal adjustment. In this 
connection, we propose to use intergenerational equity as the main criterion and to look 
into the intergenerational implications of these two stylised strategies on the basis of the 
lifetime net contribution to the government's primary balance of different cohorts. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The first section assesses the 
EU-wide projections of the ageing costs used as a benchmark in the current institutional 
context. This is done on the basis of a detailed analysis for most euro area countries.
1 
On the basis of this assessment, we present alternative estimates of the ageing costs for 
each of the different countries considered. The second section is devoted to the 
quantification of the sustainability gaps (taking into account the alternative estimates of 
the ageing costs). The third section then looks at the intergenerational implications of 
different adjustment strategies to restore fiscal sustainability along the lines suggested 
above for a selected group of euro area countries (Belgium, Germany, and France). The 
final section presents some concluding remarks. 
1  Age-related expenditure projections by the Working Group on 
Ageing Populations: a risk- assessment exercise 
1.1  The projections of the Working Group on Ageing Populations: a bird’s eye 
view 
From the mid-80s, when it became apparent that Western countries were 
experiencing major changes in their demographic structure, an increasing number of 
studies have examined the long-term prospects for public budgets. These studies usually 
focus on expenditure items which are particularly dependent on the age structure of 
populations (pensions, health, education). Some studies also develop projections for the 
primary balance and estimate the adjustment required to ensure budgetary sustainability 
(usually meaning a stable undiscounted debt to GDP ratio).   
                                                 
1   Only the country fiche for Germany is included in this paper as an annex. All individual country fiches 




International organisations have been at the forefront in the development of the 
literature.
2 Their studies allowed cross-country comparison thanks to methodological 
homogeneity. However, since the reliability of age-related expenditure projections 
depends on detailed and updated institutional knowledge, the paucity of national 
projections represented a major drawback. Growing awareness of the impact of 
population ageing gradually led to a substantial increase in the resources devoted to 
national long-term expenditure projections. Yet, at the turn of the century, projections 
for the main age-related expenditure items were available only for a few industrial 
countries.  
Against this background, the age-related expenditure projections by the Working 
Group on Ageing Populations (AWG) for EU member states come with a unique value 
added. They are produced in a multilateral setting involving national authorities and an 
international organisation, thus reconciling as much as possible national detail and 
cross-country comparability.  
The 2006 AWG report covers 25 EU member states and for most of them 
provides projections for pensions, health care, long-term care, education, and 
unemployment benefits (EPC and EC, 2006).
3 The projections reflect the impact of 
enacted legislation, including provisions already legislated but coming only into force 
over time. The report is rich in sensitivity analysis.  
In the report, the main results under the reference scenario are summarised as 
follows
4: “Overall, ageing populations” (are) “projected to lead to increases in public 
spending in most Member States by 2050 on the basis of current policies, although there 
is a wide degree of diversity across countries. The following points should be 
highlighted: 
•  for the EU15 and the Euro-area as a whole, public spending is projected to increase by 
about 4 percentage points between 2004 and 2050; […] 
                                                 
2   See Heller et al. (1986), Leibfritz et al. (1995), and Franco and Munzi (1997). 
3   Countries included are the EU15 (the 12 countries in the euro area at the time of the report – Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal – plus Denmark, Sweden and the UK) and EU10 (the ten new member states which joined the 
union before the report was prepared: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia). Not all expenditure items are projected for all 
countries. 
4   EC and EPC, 2006, p. 10. See also the table reproduced later in the main text. 
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•  most of the projected increase in public spending will be on pensions, health care and 
long-term care. Potential offsetting savings in terms of public spending on education 
and unemployment benefits are likely to be limited;  
•  the budgetary impact of ageing in most Member States starts to become apparent as of 
2010. However, the largest increases in spending […] take place between 2020 and 
2040” 
This paper focuses on the countries that were in the euro area at the time of the 
AWG report. The assumptions underlying the AWG baseline projections are analysed 
in detail in this section in order to assess whether the underlying risks are broadly 
balanced or not. To this end we mostly rely on sensitivity analyses accompanying AWG 
projections.  
The AWG projections encompass five public expenditure items which are likely 
to be affected by ageing: pensions, health care, long-term care, education and 
unemployment. Most of these items directly depend on the age structure of populations. 
Other expenditure items not considered by the AWG, such as family allowances, may 
also depend on demographics. Certain revenue categories may also be affected by 
population ageing: ageing-induced shifts in consumption patterns may have an impact 
on indirect taxes while taxes and social contributions levied on wages obviously depend 
on the age structure of the population.  
1.2  The AWG projections for ageing-related spending in the euro area: main 
results 
The AWG projections encompass the 2004-2050 period but we choose to focus on 
the 2010-2050 period since the projected change between 2004 and 2010 has in some 




                                                 
5  Early in 2007 a major social security reform was approved in Portugal. Updated projections, peer-
reviewed at the AWG and approved at the EPC in October 2007, are used throughout this paper. 
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Graph 1: Changes in dependency ratios and expenditure ratio (2010-2050) 
   
Ageing-related spending rises by 4.3 p.p. of GDP on average in the euro area 
(excluding Greece
6) over the 2010-2050 period in the baseline scenario of the AWG 
(Table 1.1). Increases range from 1.1 p.p. (Austria) to 8.9 p.p. of GDP (Spain). For most 
countries, expenditure peaks around 2040. For all countries except Austria and Italy the 
bulk of the increase comes from pensions. For Italy, this reflects the introduction of a 
defined-contribution scheme in 1995. In Austria, it is the result of reforms enacted as of 
2000 which increased the legal retirement age, linked contributions more closely to 
benefits (with actuarial reductions for early pensions) and switched the indexation rule 
for pensions from wages to prices as of 2006.  
There is no clear correlation between projected expenditure increases and 
expected changes in old-age dependency ratios. Graph 1 shows that Italy and Austria, 
whose dependency ratios are expected to increase more than average, are the countries 
where expenditure is projected to grow least. At the same time, the countries where 
expenditure is projected to grow most (Luxembourg, Spain and Ireland) and by similar 
amounts (around 8 p.p. of GDP) are characterised by very different expected increases 
                                                 




in dependency ratios (from 15 to 40 p.p.).  This reflects differences in pension systems 
rules or maturity and/or in health and long-term care policies. 
1.3  The AWG projections for ageing-related spending in the euro area: main 
assumptions 
1.3.1 Demographic assumptions 
The demographic scenario underlying the expenditure projections was prepared 
by Eurostat. It is based on, though not identical to, the EUROPOP2004 projection 
released by Eurostat in 2005.
7 The fertility rate assumptions are the same as those in the 
baseline of EUROPOP2004; the assumptions on life expectancy at birth are based on a 
scenario produced by Eurostat specifically for the AWG; the migration assumptions are 
the same as those in the baseline of EUROPOP2004 except for Germany, Italy and 
Spain, where adjustments were made to the level and/or age structure of migrants to 
incorporate more recent information.  
More specifically 
•  fertility rates increase over the projection period in all countries except France and 
Ireland, where small declines are projected for the sake of convergence. Fertility rates 
remain well below the replacement rate stabilising population size (2.1). Nevertheless, 
except for France and Ireland, the downward past trends are assumed to be curbed;  
•  life expectancy at birth is projected to rise further, though at a slower pace than over 
the 1960-2000 period, when it increased by about eight years in EU countries (three 
months per annum). 
In this scenario population in the euro area will not be much smaller in 2050, but 
it will be significantly older: population of working age will decline by 16 percent. This 
aggregate picture hides wide cross-country variation. The population is projected to fall 
sharply in Italy and Germany and to increase substantially in France, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Belgium and Luxemburg. Changes in the age structure of population are less 
diverse. Population aged less than 15 years and population of working age (from 15 to 
64 years old) will decline in all countries except Ireland and Luxembourg (by 17% and 
16% respectively, for the euro area). Population aged 65 or more will increase in all 
countries, with hikes ranging from 17% to 30%. 
                                                 
7   ‘EU-25 population rises until 2025, then falls’, Eurostat press release 448/2005, 8 April 2005. 
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1.3.2 Macroeconomic assumptions 
The participation rate is projected to increase by about 6 p.p. over 2003-2050 in 
the euro area. As a result, the workforce declines less than population of working age 
(8% versus 16%). This mainly reflects the tendency for women belonging to recent 
cohorts to have participation levels higher than those of older cohorts. Moreover, the 
trend reduction in participation rates due to population ageing is assumed to be offset by 
the effects of pension reforms. 
Unemployment rates are assumed to rapidly converge to their structural level and 
stay constant thereafter. Unemployment in the euro area is projected to fall from 9.0% 
in 2003 to 7.6% in 2010 and 6.4% in 2050. As a result, the reduction in the number of 
employed people over 2003-2050 is lower than the reduction in the workforce (5% 
versus 8%). 
Labour productivity growth rises from 1.1% on average over the 2004-10 period, 
to 1¾% over the 2011-50 period, thus limiting the slowdown in GDP growth due to 
falling employment. Potential growth rates are obtained by combining the employment 
and productivity projections. For the euro area they decrease from 2.1% in the 2004-
2010 period to 1.2% towards the end of the projection period.  
 1.3.3 “Expenditure” assumptions 
Given legislation and past contributory careers, pensions are mostly determined by 
demographic and macroeconomic assumptions, but projections for health and long-term 
care also depend on other elements such as the evolution over time of: (1) age and gender-
contingent demand and consumption of health and long-term care (as summarised in 
expenditure profiles by age category), and (2) the relative cost of services.  
The AWG reference scenario for health expenditure assumes that: (a) half of the 
projected increase in life expectancy is spent in good health
8, (b) the income elasticity 
of health care spending is close to one, and (c) the relative cost of health services does 
not change over time. 
                                                 
8   This is an intermediate hypothesis between a “pure ageing” assumption (the age profile of per capita 
spending on health remains constant over time so that all gains in life expectancy are assumed to be 




Long-term care projections assume that (a) age-specific disability rates fall by half 
of the projected decrease in age-specific mortality rates, (b) unit costs increase in line 
with GDP per worker, and (c) the probability of receiving formal care remains constant. 
The first assumption implies that about half of the projected gains in life expectancy up 
to 2050 would be spent in good health and free of disability. The second assumption 
acknowledges the labour-intensive nature of the sector and, hence, the likelihood of 
increasing relative costs (different from the reference scenario for health care). The third 
assumption implies that the share of elderly people receiving formal care remains 
constant. 
1.4 Risk  assessment 
Long-term projection exercises are subject to many uncertainties. These stem 
from various elements such as macroeconomic or demographic assumptions and the 
policy implementation risks (e.g. as regards current legislation for pension systems 
including rules on indexation of pension benefits). We try to identify and assess these 
risks in the AWG projections and, where they are deemed likely to materialise and 
quantifiable, we factor them into the projections (see section 1.5).
9 
1.4.1 Demographic and macroeconomic assumptions 
Changes in life expectancy and old-age dependency ratios may be underestimated. 
Projections underlying the AWG 2006 exercise were based on the 2000 census. For the 
countries considered here, a comparison with earlier projections based on the 1995 
census shows that in the population projections used by the AWG: (a) life expectancy at 
birth in the base year of the projections is, on average, about one year higher for both 
men and women; (b) the projected increase in life expectancy at birth up to 2050 is 
almost one year higher for men; (c) the old-age dependency ratio is 1.5 p.p. higher both 
at the beginning and at the end of the projection.  
Available information suggests that the next update of demographic projections 
could result in revisions of a similar nature in several countries. Moreover, other 
demographic assumptions (such as those concerning increases in fertility rates) can be 
questioned. Longevity projections are surrounded by a significant degree of uncertainty. 
                                                 
9  We focus the discussion below on the area as a whole. For an overview of the different countries, 
please refer to the country fiches in the aforementioned Annex.  
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The degree of this uncertainty is difficult to measure. In the past, the numbers of the 
elderly (especially the oldest) were systematically under-predicted (Visco, 2006). Yet, 
this is the group on which much of age-related expenditure is concentrated. There are 
also significant lags in the production and adoption of mortality tables.  
With respect to the macroeconomic assumptions, the projected increase in the 
participation rate can be considered either as too optimistic or too fast in some 
countries. Indeed, the overall employment rate is assumed to reach the 70% Lisbon 
employment rate target in 2020. Yet, in some countries, improvements made until now 
do not seem to be in line with this assumption. Finally, concerning the assumed 
evolution of unemployment one should consider both the variability of NAIRU 
estimates and the ad-hoc nature of the assumptions regarding the convergence to the 
EU-15 average. 
1.4.2 “Expenditure” assumptions 
With respect to pension expenditure, risks primarily pertain to the development of 
entitlements. Specific risks may come from the rising share of the elderly in the voting 
population, in particular for countries where the replacement ratio is low and/or 
indexation of pension benefits is lower than nominal wage growth. 
Demography and health status are not the only determinants of the evolution of 
health-care expenditure. Medical practices may change due to technological 
improvements or to consumer preferences. Moreover, relative costs might increase as 
productivity growth in the health sector is lower than in the rest of the economy. In the 
AWG reference scenario, however, all factors different from the evolution of morbidity 
are taken account of by assuming an elasticity of expenditure to income that is 1.1 at the 
beginning of the period, gradually declining to 1 thereafter. While the AWG justifies 
this assumption with OECD data showing that the elasticity has declined in the nineties 
relative to the eighties (EC 2005), this is likely to be due to the enactment of cost-
containment policies (price caps, wage moderation). These policies cannot be sustained 
forever (Dormont et al, 2007). Assuming a series of repeated cost-cutting reforms 
would be difficult to reconcile with a no-policy change scenario. The upside risks 
concerning income elasticity appear larger when considering that it is used as a catch-all 
term capturing also technological developments. Oliveira Martins and Maisonneuve 
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(2006) show that the growth of health care expenditure per capita has been constantly 1 
p.p. higher than that implied by ageing and forecast health status.  
Pressure for more public provision/financing of long-term care services could 
grow in the coming decades due to changes in family structure and women labour 
market participation. These trends may constrain the supply of informal care within 
households. For countries with less developed formal care systems today, the projected 
increase in public spending may underestimate the pressure.
10   
1.5  Factoring the risks into the projections 
An in-depth risk assessment was carried out for individual euro area member 
states.
11 On this basis the AWG reference scenario was modified in a mechanical way 
taking into account plausible alternative assumptions for key parameters and mostly 
using information from AWG sensitivity analyses with a view to addressing some of the 
concerns discussed above. Moreover, based on alternative sources a projection for 
Greece was added. 
For countries where more recent demographic projections are available indicating 
higher life expectancy than in the AWG reference scenario, we increase the expenditure 
projection by multiplying the difference between those more recent life expectancy 
estimates and the ones used by the AWG with the impact of an extra life year on 
spending as estimated by the AWG (an increase in life expectancy at birth of 1-1.5 year 
by 2050 is estimated to increase both pension and health expenditure by 0.3 p.p. on 
average in the EU).
12  
We also use a constant income elasticity of health expenditure as the benchmark 
assumption (1.1 throughout the projection period). AWG estimates suggest that an 
increase of 0.1 in the income elasticity of health spending leads to an expenditure 
increase of 0.6 percent of GDP on average in the euro area.  
                                                 
10  This issue is more relevant for the 'southern' Euro-area countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain than for Finland, where formal long-term care is already more developed (partly reflecting 
higher female employment rates). 
11  Please refer to the aforementioned Annex.  
12  Our use of recent demographic projections is incomplete. New projections do not necessarily revise 
life expectancy alone. For example, in the case of France, higher fertility rate would partly offset the 
impact of higher life expectancy on long term expenditure. We could not take this into account as there 
is no AWG alternative scenario for fertility rates. 
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Finally, our headline scenario is based upon an increase in the provision of formal 
long-term care. We refer to an AWG simulation based on the assumption of an increase 
by 1% a year in the share of dependent elderly people receiving formal care, for the 
2004-2020 period, with half the additional people receiving care in institutions and the 
other half at home: this entails an expenditure increase of 1.1 p.p. of GDP compared to 
the AWG reference scenario. 
1.6  Conclusions and limitations of our work 
This different set of assumptions leads to a projected increase in spending of 5.3 
p.p. of GDP for the euro area (excluding Greece
13), 1 p.p. more than in the AWG 
reference scenario (Table 1.3). Higher life expectancy only accounts for 0.3 p.p. of 
GDP; the effect is especially high for France, Germany and Austria. The increase in 
formal long-term care leads to 0.5 p.p. of GDP of extra spending, with peaks in Spain, 
the Netherlands, and Italy. Finally, constant income elasticity of health-care spending 
inflates projected expenditure by 0.2 p.p. of GDP.  
By confining ourselves to alternative AWG scenarios we may still underestimate 
risks. For instance, a 1.1 income elasticity of health expenditure may still be low; the 
increase in long-term care may be stronger than what is implied by assuming that per 
capita spending grows in line with GDP per worker; the shift towards formal long-term 
care may be more marked than in the AWG scenario. 
In addition, we do not take into account policy implementation risks which are 
especially difficult to quantify as, by their very nature, they reflect entirely discretionary 
decisions. Such risks may be large. In some countries pensions are indexed to prices 
only; this will lead to a substantial decline in benefit ratios between the start and the end 
of the retirement period which may be unsustainable.
14 There is also a risk that the 
falling purchasing power of pensions in relation to wage growth will exert pressures on 
other social security schemes. Pension reforms may thus generate additional costs in the 
form of income support and other benefits. Moreover, while projections are based on 
                                                 
13  Including Greece (with alternative sources, documented in the aforementioned Annex) the increase in 
spending amounts to 5.5 p.p.
 





current legislation, the implementation of provisions to adjust pension spending to 
demography over time may be delayed.
15  
Finally, we do not factor in macroeconomic risks. The AWG estimates that lower 
labour productivity growth by 0.25 p.p. over the projection horizon increases the level 
of pension spending by 0.4 p.p. of GDP on average in the EU. In the euro area changes 
are the highest in Portugal (1.3 p.p. of GDP) and in Austria and Spain (1.0 p.p.), while 
in Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands pensions are connected to 
earnings and no change is projected due to lower productivity. An employment rate 
which is 1 p.p. higher than the baseline is projected to result in only small changes (in 
the 0.0-0.1 range for most countries), unless the increase is concentrated among older 
workers (an increase by 5 p.p. in the employment rate of older workers is projected to 
reduce spending by 0.2 p.p. of GDP on average in the euro area, with the highest 
impacts, 0.3-0.4 p.p., in France, Austria and Belgium). 
2  Ageing and fiscal sustainability 
As indicated in the previous section, ageing will have a substantial impact on the 
budget balances of almost all euro area countries considered in the 2010-2050 period. In 
this section, the implications for the sustainability of public finances will be assessed. 
The first paragraph briefly reviews the theoretical notion of fiscal sustainability and 
assesses deficit-dynamics in the countries considered. The second paragraph then looks 
into the quantification of the sustainability gaps for these individual euro area countries. 
                                                 
15  In Italy actuarial updates adjusting entitlements to life expectancy, legislated in 1995 and due in 2005, 
were postponed. Based on a recent agreement between the government and trade unions, the update is 
expected to take place in 2010. 
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2.1  Fiscal sustainability and deficit-debt dynamics 
The notion of fiscal sustainability typically refers to the possibility of continuing 
current fiscal policy: sustainable policies are those that can be indefinitely continued 
while unsustainable policies will ultimately have to be modified. However, while the 
general intuition is clear, different specifications have been provided in the literature
16, 
generally pertaining to restrictions on the evolution of public debt. 
From a theoretical point of view, notions of sustainability fall into two broad 
families (Spaventa, 1987). According to Domar (1944), the public debt ratio should 
converge to a finite value in order to avoid that the tax burden has to rise continuously. 
Other specifications in the same vein, such as those advocated by Buiter (1985) and 
Blanchard et al (1990), are more specific and require the debt ratio to converge back to 
its initial level. These definitions try to capture the idea, first advanced by Keynes 
(1923) that an ever-increasing tax-rate is not sustainable in the long-run.  
According to a second, less restrictive notion of sustainability, fiscal policies are 
sustainable as long as the discounted value of all future primary surpluses equals the 
current level of public debt (see for example Blanchard et al, 1990). This is in turn true 
if and only if in the long run the rate of growth of the debt-to-GDP ratio is lower than 
the interest rate
17. Hence, the 'intertemporal budget constraint' expressed in ratios to 
GDP is more agnostic with respect to the path of public debt than the other definitions 
of sustainable policies.  
Despite the absence of a clear-cut theoretical benchmark, the 'conventional 
wisdom' definition of fiscal sustainability would imply that continuously rising and/or 
extremely high debt ratios are unsustainable. Against this background, it seems 
appropriate to first assess the impact of ageing on deficit-debt dynamics in the absence 
of any policy changes. 
To this end, budgetary outcomes for 2050 are calculated here taking into account 
the macroeconomic projections of the AWG's 2006 Report (European Commission, 
2006) and assuming that from 2008 onwards the primary balance is only affected by the 
                                                 
16  See Balassone and Franco (2000) for a detailed overview. 
17 An infinite number of sequences for the primary balance can in principle satisfy the intertemporal 
budget constraint and if the latter is expressed in ratios to GDP, some sequences may even imply a 
continuously increasing debt ratio.  
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ageing-related changes in government expenditure determined in section 1. The implicit 
interest rate on public debt was assumed to converge to 5.1% (which corresponds to a 
real rate of 3% and inflation of 2%, as assumed by the AWG) for all countries by 2015. 
No deficit-debt adjustments were taken into account. A similar set of assumptions will 
be used throughout this section for the calculation of the different sustainability 
indicators. 
Graph 2.1 - Fiscal outcomes in the absence of policy changes
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Public debt in 2050
Budget balance in 2050
 
¹  Assuming that government revenue and non-ageing related primary expenditure (in structural terms) remain 
constant with respect to GDP at the 2007 level and that the implicit interest rate on public debt gradually 
converges to 5.1% by 2015. 
This exercise suggests that, taking into account the likely budgetary consequences 
of population ageing in the next decades, public finances are currently only sustainable 




in Finland. That country would still record a budget surplus of close to 2.5% of GDP in 
2050 with a negative public debt ratio of some 60% of GDP
18. Only in Finland deficit-
debt dynamics would be favourable at the end of the period considered. All other 
countries considered would end up with substantial and increasing deficit and debt 
ratios in 2050 (only in Austria, Germany and Spain public debt would be smaller than 
GDP in 2050). Hence, it seems clear that in all countries considered, except Finland, 
policies will ultimately have to be modified. 
2.2  Measurement of sustainability gaps 
As is clear from the wide range of deficit and debt ratios attained in 2050, the 
extent to which policies have to be changed in order to restore fiscal sustainability 
differs from country to country. Different approaches for the measurement of these 
'sustainability gaps' exist. They typically attempt to quantify the fiscal effort required to 
reach a certain outcome at a pre-determined date in the future. 
In this connection, the tax-gap indicator proposed by Blanchard et al (1990) can 
be considered as one of the most general examples: it measures the required change in 
the tax ratio that, taking into account the projected development of primary expenditure 
and assumptions concerning the implicit interest rate on public debt and deficit-debt 
adjustments, would yield the same public debt ratio at the end of a given period as the 
one existing at the beginning of that period. In the context of the ageing problem, the 
period considered could be the one covered by the projections of ageing-related 
expenditure pressures (until 2050 in the case of the AWG) and the indicator would then 
measure the adjustment needed to avoid an increase in the debt ratio due to ageing.  
2.2.1 Sustainability indicators used by the European Commission 
The European Commission typically uses two quantitative indicators in its 
assessment of the sustainability of public finances in EU Member States (e.g. European 
Commission, 2007). The so-called S1 indicator is inspired by both the tax-gap indicator 
proposed by Blanchard et al. and the reference value for public debt defined in the 
Treaty on the European Community: it is defined as the size of the 'permanent 
                                                 
18 It should be stressed that, in actual practice, a gross consolidated debt ratio (Maastricht definition) can 
not fall below zero. Negative values for debt ratios used throughout this paper should be understood as 
a(n increase in the) net financial asset position. 
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budgetary adjustment necessary for the gross consolidated debt to reach 60% of GDP in 
2050'. It is more specifically defined as the difference between the primary balance 
required in a certain target year to bring the debt ratio to 60% in 2050 - assuming that, 
after the target year, the primary balance is only affected by the ageing-related 
expenditure increases - and the one actually projected for that target year. It should be 
stressed that this S1 indicator is time-dependent: The S1 indicators published by the 
European Commission are typically linked to a target year in the medium term (e.g. at 
the end of the time horizon of the stability programmes) but, in principle, S1 can also be 
calculated using t+1 as the target year. Apart from the estimates of these ageing costs, 
the calculation of S1 also depends on a number of assumptions pertaining to activity 
growth, the implicit-interest rate on public debt and deficit-debt adjustments. 
The S1 indicator was re-calculated using 2015 as the target year and taking into 
account the ageing costs derived in section 1 and using similar assumptions (e.g. on 
activity growth, the implicit interest rate on public debt, deficit-debt adjustments) as 
above. For the debt ratio, the gross consolidated debt according to the Maastricht 
definition was used
19. The results show that Austria, Germany and, especially, Finland 
would overshoot the primary balance required by 2015 to reach a 60% debt ratio in 
2050 without any policy changes, as witnessed by the negative values for the S1 
indicator. All other countries considered need to tighten fiscal policy in order to prevent 
the debt ratio from exceeding 60% in 2050 with the required improvements in the 
primary balance ranging from 0.2% of GDP for Spain to 9.4% of GDP for Greece
20. 
                                                 
19  For some countries, the European Commission subtracts assets in pension funds from the debt position 
and therefore uses a modified (net) debt concept (see European Commission, 2005). In theory, i.e. with 
perfect capital markets, including financial assets as a stock variable in the intertemporal budget 
constraint leads to the same result as including the return on these assets as a flow variable since, from 
a present-value perspective, future interest or dividend payments would be equal to the current value of 
assets. Including both, the stock and the flow variable, however, would imply that the assets are 
counted twice. As the primary balance includes returns on financial assets, our calculations are based 
on gross debt figures (i.e. without deducting public pension fund assets).  
  In addition, we – like the EC (2007) – assume that returns on property income stay constant in relation 
to GDP which requires a growing asset position. While this might not be fully consistent with the 
assumption of zero deficit-debt adjustments, the resulting error should be small for most countries. 
Only for countries with large financial asset positions (the Netherlands and Finland) the sustainability 
indicators might more substantially underestimate the true size of the problem (see European 
Commission, 2006). 
20  As the AWG report (EPC and EC, 2006) does not provide any projections for pension expenditure 
alternative sources were used, most notably the pension projections in the updates of the Greek 




These estimates are more pessimistic than those by the European Commission (4/2006), 
that considers public finances of IE, NL and FI as sustainable according to S1. As 
pointed out in Langenus (2006) the S1 indicator can be criticised as closing the 
indicated sustainability gap, i.e. bringing the primary balance to the level suggested by 
the indicator, only leads to a certain debt ratio by 2050 but does not restrict debt 
dynamics after that date in any way. For all of the countries considered here, debt 
dynamics would actually be unfavourable if they implement the fiscal adjustment 
suggested by the S1 indicator: keeping the primary balance constant after 2050 would 
imply a (rapidly) increasing debt ratio from the level of 60% in 2050, which seems at 
odds with the 'common wisdom' definition of fiscal sustainability. In addition, this 
clearly violates the Maastricht convergence criterion requiring that debt ratios above 
60% have to be reduced at a satisfactory pace. 
Graph 2.2 - Sustainability indicators: S12015 
(percentages of GDP) 







S1 Required primary balance in 2015
 
 
The second sustainability indicator that is routinely used by the European 
Commission, the so-called S2 indicator, is more directly linked to the aforementioned 
theoretical definition of sustainability proposed by Blanchard et al (1990): it measures 
the size of the 'permanent budgetary adjustment necessary to fulfil the intertemporal 
budget constraint' (European Commission, 2007). It should be stressed that, in principle, 
an infinite number of sequences for the primary balance can satisfy this constraint. 
Hence, the indicator needs to be defined more clearly to be operational.  
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As for S1, the S2 indicator used by the European Commission is time-dependent. 
The required 'permanent budgetary adjustment' is calibrated as the difference between 
the primary balance required in a certain target year to equate the present value of the 
sequence of all future primary balances in percentages of GDP (and assuming that, after 
the target year, the primary balance is only affected by the ageing-related spending 
increases) to the debt ratio projected at the beginning of the target year and the primary 
balance actually projected for that target year. Under the assumption that growth and 
interest rates stay constant over time, this can be mathematically expressed as (see 
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with:  pbi = (projected) primary balance for year i (in percentages of GDP) 
 d i = (projected) public debt for year i (in percentages of GDP) 
  r = interest rate 
  g = GDP growth rate 
  ty = chosen target year 
 
It should be stressed that, as S2 (nor S1) is not discounted back to the current year, 
the exact value of this indicator depends on the chosen target year and will be higher, 
the further this target year lies in the future.  
By choosing the appropriate discount factor - () ) 1 /( 1 r g + + in the formula above 
with, more specifically, r being set equal to the implicit interest rate on public debt - the 
definition of S2 is clearly linked to the law of motion of the public debt ratio. Since the 
primary balance is assumed to be affected by the ageing costs only and, hence, stays 
constant after the last year covered by projections of ageing costs, compliance with the 
intertemporal budget constraint then implies a constant public debt ratio after that year, 
as shown in Box 1. As the AWG projections currently cover the years up to 2050, S2 is 
actually equal to the fiscal effort needed in a given target year to reach a debt-stabilising 
budget balance in 2050. The corresponding debt ratio reached in 2050 (and maintained 
thereafter) differs from country to country and depends on the implicit interest rate 
(which, however, is the same for all countries concerned according to the assumptions 
used here) and economic growth after 2050 and the primary balance reached in 2050 
(see box 1). The latter depends in turn on the initial conditions and the ageing costs. 
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Box 1 - The intertemporal budget constraint, the S2 indicator and debt dynamics 
The European Commission uses the S2 indicator to operationalise the theoretical 
benchmark of the intertemporal budget constraint. The purpose of this box is to show 
that in the particular circumstances studied in this paper (and also assumed by the 
European Commission to calculate S2) with the activity growth, the implicit interest 
rate on public debt and the primary balance being assumed constant after a certain date 
(2050), the S2 indicator is equivalent to imposing a constant public debt ratio from that 
date onwards. 
The intertemporal budget constraint generally implies: 
i
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with: di = debt ratio in year i 
 pbi = the ratio of the primary balance to GDP in year i 
  g = nominal GDP growth (assumed constant, for simplicity) 
  r = the implicit interest rate on public debt (assumed constant, for simplicity) 
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              (6), which means that:  d d d T j t j = = 〉 ∀ :             (7) 
Hence, the S2 indicator is equivalent to imposing a constant debt ratio in the post-2050 
period. 
 
The S2 indicator is also re-calculated here using 2015 as the target year and taking 
into account the same assumptions as for S1. According to this indicator, public 
finances are currently only sustainable in Finland. For all other countries the value for 
S2 is positive, ranging from 0.7% of GDP in Austria to close to 13% of GDP for 
Greece. Similarly, the European Commission (4/2006) only considers public finances 
sustainable in Finland according to the S2 indicator; however it indicates a much 
smaller adjustment effort for the remaining countries. The constant debt ratios reached 
as of 2050, if the fiscal adjustment suggested by the S2 indicator was implemented, also 
vary greatly, from more than 50% of GDP in Italy to large negative debt ratios in Spain, 
Ireland, Luxembourg and Greece. Differences in the stable end-of-period debt ratio are 
mainly related to the primary balance reached at the end of the period by the different 
countries. In the Italian case, for instance, the primary balance is still positive, which 
implies a positive debt ratio in 2050 (as the implicit interest rate on public debt exceeds 
nominal GDP growth for all countries). This is also the case for other countries with 
relatively low ageing costs such as Austria and France. For countries with much higher 
ageing-related expenditure increases, such as Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain and Greece, 
the adjustment effort implied by S2 would lead to a primary deficit - and, hence, a 
negative debt ratio - in 2050. 
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Graph 2.3 - Sustainability indicators: S22015 
(percentages of GDP) 




























¹ This is the constant debt ratio that would apply from 2050 onwards if the sustainability gap was closed by increasing the primary balance expected 
  for the target year (2015) by S2.
p.m. public debt ratio from 2050 onwards¹
S2 Required primary balance in 2015
 
 
 2.2.2   Alternative sustainability indicators 
Two alternative sustainability indicators are proposed in Langenus (2006). The 
first one, S3, is a variant of the S2 indicator used by the European Commission. Rather 
than defining the budgetary adjustment required to reach a debt-stabilising budget 
balance in 2050 (or, more generally, at the end of the period considered) as an 'abrupt' 
increase in the target year, the required adjustment is calibrated as a gradual improve-
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ment of the primary balance in the years leading up to the target year. As the fiscal 
adjustment starts earlier, S3 is typically somewhat lower than S2, all other things equal.  
The second alternative indicator, S4 (originally used by Delbecque and Bogaert 
(1994)) measures the required gradual adjustment in the primary balance in the period 
up to the target year in order to reach a balanced budget by 2050. Like S1, this indicator 
does in principle not restrict debt dynamics and may correspond to a rising public debt 
ratio after the period considered. However, since the restriction imposed by S4 (a 
balanced budget in 2050) is stronger than the one associated with S1 (a debt ratio of 
60% in 2050), the public finance position at the end of the period considered implied by 
S4 is typically much sounder than the one implied by S1. 
Table 2.1 - Sustainability indicators: S3 2015 and S4 2015 
(percentages of GDP) 















            
Finland -0.4  4.1  -38.5  -0.7  3.7  -19.2 
Austria 0.7  2.6  10.6  0.7  2.7  5.7 
Germany 1.2  4.5  -18.8  1.1  4.4  -10.0 
Italy 1.4  4.3  48.7  1.8  4.7  25.1 
Spain 3.5  7.1  -139.8  2.4  6.0  -75.9 
Belgium 3.1  6.3  -20.1  2.9  6.1  -9.7 
Netherlands 4.1  4.8  -26.7  3.8  4.5  -12.2 
Ireland 5.5  5.6  -130.5  4.1  4.3  -64.4 
Portugal 4.4  4.4  -45.5  4.1  4.0  -24.6 
France 4.4  3.9  7.4  4.4  4.0  3.5 
Luxembourg 7.8  7.9  -130.4  5.6  5.7  -43.2 
Greece 12.0  10.8  -151.5  10.8  9.6  -80.2 
            
1  Figures in bold italics indicate a rising debt ratio in the post-2050 period if the 2050 primary balance is kept constant as a 
percentage of GDP. 
 
Both of the alternative sustainability indicators were calculated taking into 
account the same assumptions as for S1 and S2. The results for S3 are very much in line 
with those for S2: public finances currently only seem to be sustainable in Finland. All 
other countries will need to adjust their fiscal policy. Sustainability gaps are much 
smaller in Austria, Germany and Italy than in Ireland, Portugal, France, Luxembourg 
and, especially, Greece. As for S2, substantial negative public debt ratios are associated 
with the fiscal adjustment effort implied by S3 in many of the countries considered. 
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The results for the S4 indicator are quite similar. The ranking of countries on the 
basis of sustainability concerns is only marginally different: Finland is again the only 
country where public finances appear to be sustainable while the biggest sustainability 
gaps are found for the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, France, Luxembourg and, 
especially, Greece. Debt ratios in 2050 associated with the adjustment effort implied by 
S4 range from 25% in Italy to large negative values in Greece, Spain and Ireland. For 
some countries, deficit-debt dynamics at the end of the period considered are 
unfavourable with the debt ratios set to worsen as of 2050 if the primary balance is kept 
constant. However, in the sample this is only the case for countries that post negative 
debt ratios in 2050. 
All in all, the analysis carried out in this section clearly shows that population 
ageing jeopardises fiscal sustainability in all the euro area countries considered except 
Finland. The actual measurement of sustainability gaps differs depending on the 
indicators used and, more specifically, their definition of the adjustment effort required 
to restore sustainability. However, the lowest sustainability gaps are typically found for 
Austria, Germany and Italy - countries that have undertaken more important pension 
reforms in the recent past - while the problems appear to be more severe in the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, France, Luxembourg and, in particular, Greece. 
The sustainability indicators used here are based upon a concrete specification of 
the adjustment effort needed to close the sustainability gap. By their construction, they 
are typically of the 'pre-funding' type, i.e. they measure the size of an 'early' adjustment 
effort, as the chosen target year usually does not lie very far in the future. However, this 
should by no means be interpreted as a policy recommendation: the indicators only 
measure the size of the problem taking the medium term as the relevant benchmark, 
they do not imply anything about the appropriateness of such a relatively early 
adjustment effort to restore fiscal sustainability. The issue of which policy response is 
more appropriate - e.g. the 'early' fiscal adjustment measured by the sustainability 
indicators or a more gradual restoration of fiscal sustainability over the whole 2008-
2050 period - can only be addressed on the basis of clearly defined criteria and this is 
done in the next section. 
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 3  Intergenerational distribution effects of alternative adjustment 
strategies 
3.1 Introduction 
So far we have looked at the implications of demographic ageing on the public 
expenditure of twelve euro area countries on the basis of AWG projections. We have 
adjusted these estimates where it was deemed appropriate and derived new headline 
figures for the expected increase in the ratio of ageing-related expenditure to GDP 
(section 1). On the basis of these new headline estimates sustainability gaps for the 
twelve countries considered were calculated and it was shown that current policies are 
not sustainable for most countries (section 2).  
In this section, the relative merits of different budgetary strategies to ensure fiscal 
sustainability are investigated. This question has received considerable attention from 
EU political bodies for a long time. In a report to the March 2001 European Council of 
Stockholm, the Commission and the Ecofin Council agreed on a three-pronged strategy 
for addressing the budgetary consequences of demographic ageing: i) achieving or 
maintaining budget balances that reduce public debt at a fast pace and thereby lower 
interest payments and allow for a (partial) pre-funding of ageing-related costs; ii) raising 
employment rates especially amongst older workers and women, and iii) reforming 
social transfer systems (possibly including funding of public pensions). More recently, 
the debate has gained momentum. In the context of the 2005 reform of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, the Council called for implicit liabilities to be taken into account in the 
determination of medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs) for EU member states. In 
the debate on how to implement this request, one of the main questions is to what extent 
future ageing-related expenditure should be pre-funded by attaining high primary 
surpluses in the following years. 
In principle, many different combinations and characteristics of the three-pronged 
strategy defined in 2001 are conceivable. Here, the focus is exclusively on the 
budgetary component, i.e. different choices concerning the adjustments to the (primary) 
budget balance. However, the methodology suggested here can in principle be extended 
to also include specific reforms aimed at increasing participation rates or reducing 
ageing-related expenditure. In any case, the impact of past reforms and a gradual 
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increase in participation rates are already included in the adjusted AWG projections 
which form the basis of this section.  
A range of criteria can be applied when assessing the appropriateness of different 
budgetary strategies. For example, the impact on economic growth could be considered. 
An early adjustment might require a pronounced fiscal tightening over the following 
years, which could prove to be disruptive to the economy in the short run, even tough it 
might lead to higher GDP in the long run.
21 In this paper, we only look at the criterion 
of intergenerational distribution.  
Budgetary strategies can differ with respect to a number of dimensions. We show 
results that compare strategies affecting different sets of budgetary categories: The case 
of a lump sum tax is simulated by distributing the adjustment burden equally on persons 
of all ages while an increase e.g. in social security contributions is modelled by 
burdening the working age population only. However, the main focus is on strategies 
that differ with respect to the timing of the adjustment effort. Therefore, an ‘early 
adjustment’ scenario, closing the sustainability gap by 2015, along the lines suggested 
by the S4 indicator, is compared to a ‘gradual adjustment’ scenario, in which 
consolidation is stretched out over the period 2008-2050.  
To make sure that the conclusions of the analysis are robust with respect to 
countries’ initial conditions and ageing prospects, a sufficiently diverse group of euro 
area member states is selected: i) Germany with a low sustainability gap due to a 
relatively favourable initial budget balance and a slightly below average increase in 
ageing-related expenditure, ii) Belgium which has a medium-sized sustainability gap, 
despite a relatively favourable initial budget balance, due to a sharp projected increase 
in ageing-related expenditure, and iii) France which has a comparatively large 
sustainability gap, despite a below average expected increase in ageing-related 
expenditure, due to an unfavourable initial budgetary position.
22  
                                                 
21  See e.g. Hauner, Leigh and Skaarup (2007). 
22 This assessment is based on the results for the S4 indicator shown in table 2.1. The European 
Commission (2008) judges the three considered countries to be at “medium risk” with Germany being 
a borderline case to low risk. 
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3.2  Methodology and data 
In the literature, issues of intergenerational distribution are usually analysed 
within the framework of generational accounting.
23 Like most sustainability indicators, 
generational accounting takes into account the intertemporal budget constraint. 
However, it adds an intergenerational perspective to the analysis. This is achieved by 
calculating the present value of total net tax payments to the government over the 
(remaining) lifetime of a cohort born in a specific year, where net tax payments are 
defined as taxes paid minus transfers received.
24 This present value of net tax payments 
is labelled generational account. The intergenerational distribution of the net tax burden 
is analysed by comparing the generational accounts of different cohorts.
25 
Usually, the generational account of a newborn in the base year is compared to 
that of future generations (those born after the base year). According to the customary, 
albeit arbitrary, convention in generational accounting, all generations already living in 
the base year are exempted from the policy change necessary to satisfy the 
intertemporal budget constraint while any required adjustment effort is spread evenly 
over all future generations. Therefore, generational accounts in general indicate a higher 
burden for future generations if a sustainability gap exists.  
In this section, we in principle follow the generational accounting approach. 
However, the conventional generational accounting methodology has several drawbacks 
with regard to our objective and we tried to accommodate this by introducing some 
modifications. Firstly, most generational accounting studies for Europe forecast pension 
expenditure on the basis of their own models. These models are necessarily less 
elaborate than the sometimes very sophisticated pension models and databases that are 
                                                 
23  A different approach has been suggested by Langenus and Eugène (2005) and applied by Langenus 
(2006). They compare the implications of different budgetary strategies on the evolution of an average 
working-age person’s financial contribution to the government’s primary balance over time. They 
regard a situation in which successive generations of workers contribute roughly the same amount, 
corrected for nominal wage growth, as “intergenerationally fair”. The main difference between this and 
the generational accounting approach is that they take a cross-section instead of a longitudinal 
perspective, as they focus on net tax payments for individual years rather than over the total lifetime of 
a cohort.  
24  In some studies, not only transfers but also other government expenditure such as spending on general 
administration, domestic and external security, and investment are allocated (evenly) to different 
cohorts. 
25 Of course, only generational accounts at birth are comparable as the generational account of e.g. a 30-
year old person fails to reflect the net tax payments already borne over the first three decades of his/her 
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used in projections by national institutions. Since future pension expenditure is 
determined not only by cohort effects but also by numerous legislative changes the full 
impact of which is sometimes only felt after several decades, it is preferable to revert to 
pension forecasts made with large models and a comprehensive database. This might be 
less obvious for other revenue and expenditure categories which are less influenced by 
effects that fully mature only after a long time. By basing our calculations on the 
(adjusted) AWG projections, we benefited from the detailed national forecasts that enter 
these projections.
26 This approach also ensures consistency – except for the adjustments 
made in section 1 - with the AWG projections which underlie the sustainability analysis 
at the European level. However, this procedure also implies that all revenue and 
expenditure categories not deemed to be age-specific by the AWG are distributed 
evenly over all cohorts – an assumption that is clearly not in line with empirical facts. 
However, with a more extensive database, this exercise could be extended to a fully-
fledged generational accounting procedure with age-specific expenditure profiles for a 
wide range of additional budgetary categories.  
A second drawback of the standard generational accounting approach is that the 
focus is on two cohorts only – newborns and those born one year later (representing 
future generations). As shown, for example, by Bonin (2001), with increasing life 
expectancy and policy measures that become effective only in the future, generational 
accounts of future generations cannot just be represented by the cohort born immediate-
ly after the base year: the generational account changes for every future generation. 
Moreover, considering the full lifetime generational accounts only of cohorts born in the 
base year (2007 in our study) or later implies that the intergenerational redistribution 
between all currently living cohorts can not be analysed correctly. We therefore 
explicitly calculate total lifetime generational accounts for the cohorts born between 
1970 and 2050.
27 To our knowledge, this has rarely been done before.
28 
                                                                                                                                               
life. For a more detailed description of the generational accounting approach see, for example, 
Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1994), Raffelhüschen (1999) or Bonin (2001). 
26  A drawback of this procedure is that these models are often not fully disclosed to the public and 
therefore are largely a ‘black box’ to outsiders. The AWG tries to overcome this problem by a peer 
review process. 
27  While more generations are alive in the period 1970 to 2150 in which we analyse public finance 
developments, only for cohorts born between 1970 and 2050 their whole lifespan is covered. 
28  One example is Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlifkoff (1995). 
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We then compare lifetime generational accounts under different budgetary 
strategies. Instead of explicitly targeting an ‘optimal’ strategy that minimises 
intergenerational redistribution, we compare two strategies that differ in the timing of 
the adjustment. In the first strategy, named early adjustment approach, the primary 
balance is increased in equal yearly steps until 2015 to ensure a balanced budget in 
2050. In the second strategy, named gradual approach, the fiscal adjustment is spread 
out over the whole 2008-2050 period. This gradual adjustment is calibrated to generate 
the same public debt ratio in 2150 as the early adjustment strategy with a view to 
making both strategies comparable when analysing their intergenerational implications. 
The restriction of an identical public debt ratio in 2150 may not be fully 
satisfactory when comparing the lifetime burden for two alternative budgetary strategies 
of generations born until 2050 only as the public debt ratio in 2150 is obviously also 
affected by (part of) the lifetime burden of generations born in the 2051-2150 period. 
Theoretically, a comparison of alternative budgetary strategies on the basis of 
intergenerational equity may then be biased by neglecting the generations born after 
2050. However, alternative restrictions to make the budgetary strategies considered 
comparable - e.g. an identical debt ratio in 2050 - were deemed to be less appropriate.  
Once the calculations are done, we need a criterion to decide which strategy has 
the more equitable distributional consequences. In the literature, several alternatives are 
proposed. Among the most prominent are the utilitarian social welfare function, that 
under restrictive assumptions implies redistribution until complete equality is achieved, 
and the maximin criterion proposed by Rawls, which maximises the utility of the person 
with the minimum utility.
29 However, the assumptions under which these results are 
derived are highly questionable and it is unclear how this should be applied in an 
intertemporal setting. In this regard, taking a constant net tax burden across different 
generations as a benchmark is an appealing solution. It is an economical solution in 
terms of computational effort, it is easily understood and has the property to give equal 
weight to present and future generations even though the latter do not take part in 
current political decision-making process. It needs to be pointed out, however, that the 
intergenerational distribution of the burden imposed by government budgetary activity 
                                                 
29  See e.g. Rosen (1999) and Rawls (1971). 
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is ultimately a normative question that does not have clear-cut answers.
30 An efficiency 
argument may also be made for an even distribution of lifetime net tax payments, as 
Barro (1979) has shown that an unchanged tax ratio minimises the deadweight loss of 
taxation.
31  
Therefore, in this paper an adjustment strategy will be deemed preferable if it 
leads to a flatter time profile for the total net tax burden across cohorts born in different 
years. This assumes that a relatively constant net lifetime contribution to the 
government's primary balance (deflated by nominal per capita GDP) across generations 
can be deemed equitable. This is methodologically close to imposing a constant lifetime 
net tax rate for all generations – a concept named generational balance in the 
generational accounting literature. Alternative definitions could pertain to keeping either 
the absolute (discounted) amount of the lifetime contribution constant across 
generations or the difference between market income and this amount constant across 
generations. These definitions would be consistent with a net tax rate that is, 
respectively, constantly decreasing or increasing over time.  












, , , .  
In this equation, D represents the highest age considered,  s z a h , ,  the age-specific 
per capita amounts of individual revenue and primary expenditure categories z for a 
person of age a in year s and Ss,k the likelihood of a person born in k to survive until 
period s, while r denotes the discount rate.  
The age-profiles h for the individual ageing-related expenditure categories 
(pension, health, long-term care, unemployment and education) are taken from various 
sources.
32 However, the delineation of these sources often does not exactly match those 
in the national accounts. It is therefore clear that the payment profiles obtained in this 
way and extrapolated to cover the population as a whole deviate from the aggregate 
                                                 
30  In fact, similar to progressive income taxation, an intertemporally rising net tax rate has sometimes 
been proposed in the literature in order to redistribute from (richer) future to (poorer) currently living 
generations. 
31    However, Barro’s proposition only holds under certain assumptions and moreover relates to the 
(marginal) tax rate while here we refer to net taxes (taxes minus transfers). 
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figures shown in the national accounts. For this reason we adopt a two-stage approach, 
as is customary in the literature. In the first stage, the age-specific payment profiles are 
derived from the various data sources. In the second stage, the age-specific per capita 
amounts are multiplied by a scaling factor which is uniform for all age groups. This 
scaling factor is defined so as to ensure that in the aggregate - taking into account the 
size of the age classes - the respective national account figure is reached. In other 
words, while in the first stage only the relative positions of persons of different ages are 
determined, in the second stage the absolute payment profiles are calculated.  
This two-stage approach not only ensures consistency between absolute age-
specific payment profiles and the national accounts data but also allows us to 
circumvent the limitation that we usually have relative payment profiles only for one 
point in time. Since the relative payment profiles typically change little over time, it is 
possible to use relative payment profiles which were obtained before (or after) the year 
under consideration, without this involving a major error.
33 By contrast, the national 
accounts data needed for calculating the absolute payment profiles (which are subject to 
stronger fluctuations) are available for all years in the period from 1970 to 2050.  
The national accounts figures for the years from 1970 to 2007 for the five age-
related expenditure items, the (primary) balance and GDP are available from national 
statistical institutes. However, the delineation often differs from that used by the AWG. 
Therefore a scaling factor was used in order to align national accounts figures to the 
AWG definition.
34 For the period 2008 to 2050 we used the adjusted AWG projections 
derived in section 1. For the years 2050 to 2150 we held the absolute age-profiles we 
obtained for 2050 constant (except for an adjustment for inflation and per capita GDP 
growth) and computed the macroeconomic aggregates by combining these profiles with 
the population forecast.  
                                                                                                                                               
32  As pointed out above, all other budget categories are distributed evenly over all age classes. 
33  While most policy measures leave the relative age-specific payments profiles unaffected, these profiles 
change, for example in the case of a legislated increase in the retirement age.  
34  The scaling factor reflects the difference between national accounts and AWG data for 2004. In the 
case of Germany, a similar procedure was applied to link east German to west German data for the 
years before reunification. In addition for Germany some budgetary items like e.g. development aid 
were assumed not to benefit or burden the resident population. Also therefore results are not fully 
comparable between countries. 
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The population data are likewise taken from national sources for past years while 
AWG figures were used for the years up to 2050.
35 After 2050 the population is held 
constant in the baseline. However, keeping not only overall population size but also 
population structure at the 2050 level is clearly not realistic for most countries. This is 
why in a sensitivity analysis we also calculated national accounts on the basis of an 
explicit population projection that applies the AWG’s fertility, mortality and migration 
assumptions for 2050 to the following years as well.  
Concerning the discount rate employed for deriving the present value of lifetime 
net tax payments, we relied on the AWG’s assumption of a real interest rate of 3% and 
inflation of 2% for future years. For the past we used the yield on long-term bonds 
issued by the respective government. The absolute payment profiles for the years after 
2050 were extrapolated with the growth rate of GDP  per capita,  while GDP was 
expected to continue to grow with the rate assumed by the AWG for the period 2040 to 
2050. The latter assumption reflects the method chosen by the Commission, and 
adopted also in section 2 of this paper, for the calculation of sustainability indicators. In 
order to make lifetime net tax payments of different cohorts comparable, they were 
discounted by the nominal growth rate of per capita GDP. While other methods are 
conceivable, this implies that the lifetime net tax payment is adjusted for increases in 
GDP per capita for successive cohorts. So when cohorts are shown to have the same 
lifetime net tax payments this does not imply that their absolute net tax payments are 
equal, but that their lifetime net payments in relation to per capita GDP at birth are 
similar.  
Obviously, all the methodological and data limitations that fully-fledged 
generational accounting exercises are subject to also apply to our more restricted 
approach.
36 Moreover, since we follow the AWG’s presumption that most revenue and 
expenditure categories are not age-specific, while in fact generational accounting 
studies have shown a clear lifecycle pattern for them, the absolute value of our lifetime 
net tax payments should be interpreted with great caution. The same holds for the 
                                                 
35  Survival probabilities for past years were obtained from the Human Mortality Database, University of 
California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). 
Available at http://www.mortality.org or http://www.humanmortality.de. As pointed out in section 1, 




differences in the total lifetime burden between countries as well as between males and 
females. The latter depend on a sometimes arbitrary allocation of payments within 
households. This is why we chose to show either the lifetime net tax payments for 
women or for men for a specific country. The comparison between the lifetime net tax 
payments of different cohorts is, however, more meaningful. Nevertheless, our results 
should be treated with some caution when drawing policy conclusions. While the basic 
methodological framework we use is, in our view, adequate for analysing 
intergenerational distribution issues, we were confronted with considerable deficiencies 
on the data side. Our results should therefore be taken as an indication for what would 
be possible with a more complete data set.  
 3.3  Results: Comparing the lifetime net tax burden of alternative adjustment 
strategies for different cohorts 
3.3.1 Results for the baseline 
In the baseline scenario we compare the intergenerational distribution of lifetime 
net tax payments of different cohorts under the assumption that the required adjustment 
is accomplished by increasing the primary budget balance through any of the non-
ageing related categories. This implies that the adjustment burden is distributed evenly 
over all age classes. The picture that emerges in this case is quite similar for the three 
countries considered (compare graphs 3.1 to 3.3). Earlier-born cohorts who have already 
entered into working age face the lowest burden, while later-born generations have to 
pay much higher net taxes. The burden increase is very steep between the 1980 cohort 
and the 2005 cohort (1970 and 1995 for Belgium). For subsequent cohorts, the burden 
declines slightly under the early adjustment strategy, while it keeps increasing – though 
less rapidly than between the 1980 and 2005 cohorts – under the gradual adjustment 
strategy (with the exception of Germany, where the burden declines after the 2005 
cohort also under the gradual adjustment strategy). As could be expected, the lines for 
the early adjustment and the gradual strategy are quite close together in the case of 
Germany, which has a small sustainability gap, and are wider apart for the other two 
countries, where larger adjustment efforts are needed. In fact, if sustainability had 
already been attained and no further adjustments were required, the lines would match 
                                                                                                                                               
36  See Havemann (1994), Raffelhüschen (1999), or Manzke (2002). 
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exactly. None of the strategies considered would, however, sufficiently burden currently 
living generations and alleviate future generations to achieve an even intergenerational 
distribution.
37 
Visual inspection of graphs 3.1 to 3.3 already reveals that the early adjustment 
strategy leads to more even outcomes than the gradual one. In all three countries 
considered, it levies a higher burden on earlier-born cohorts who, compared to later-
born cohorts, face a lower burden and relieves cohorts born later that face higher net tax 
payments than older cohorts. The crossing of the two lines, which indicates a lower 
burden under early adjustment for all later-born cohorts, is reached around the year 
2016, while the highest burden under early adjustment is borne by the cohorts born 
about a decade earlier. For France and Belgium, the burden for generations born close to 
the middle of the 21
st century obtained under the gradual approach would be markedly 
higher than the peak burden for generations born around 2005 under early adjustment. 
For Germany, the peak is attained around 2005 under both strategies and is slightly 
higher under early adjustment.  
The conclusion that the early adjustment strategy leads to a more even 
intergenerational distribution is confirmed by the range of indicators displayed in table 
3.1. The maximum burden, the difference between the maximum and the minimum 
burden and the standard deviation all point to a more favourable outcome under early 
adjustment. As already apparent from the graphs, the maximum burden for Germany is 
the only exception while the difference between the maximum and the minimum burden 
is about the same for that country. Nevertheless, as shown in table 3.1, even for 




                                                 
37  A higher burden on currently living generations could be attained by concentrating the adjustment 
effort on the elderly. However, as pointed out earlier, searching for budgetary strategies that lead to an 
even intergenerational distribution is not the objective of this paper.  
38  Indeed, at least for our sample of countries, the intergenerational distribution of the early adjustment 





























































































































in euro in euro
3.1 Belgium:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Men) 
of Cohort born in...
3.2 Germany:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Men) 
of Cohort born in...
3.3 France:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Women) 




















*   The lifetime net tax burden is defined as the present value over the lifetime of taxes paid to minus 
benefits (primary expenditure) received from the government. 
3.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we performed several sensitivity 
analyses. First, we tested the impact of an alternative assumption on the distribution of 
the adjustment burden over the different age groups. In fact, it seems quite reasonable to 
expect that the adjustment burden will not be spread out evenly over all age-classes but 
will be concentrated on the population of  working-age. Indeed, it is a well established 
result of fully-fledged generational accounting studies that the working-age population 
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   Women 58,200 65,100 12,800 15,600 20.4 24.1 76,000 78,800
   Men 55,200 65,800 12,900 16,100 23.0 27.9 66,900 73,300
Germany
   Women 56,300 56,300 29,600 30,400 25.7 26.2 140,400 139,600
   Men 52,500 52,500 26,500 27,400 26.7 27.3 121,600 120,500
France
   Women 55,800 78,100 19,900 27,000 19.7 25.9 117,700 134,900
   Men 49,400 72,600 18,500 25,600 23.9 32.3 92,300 109,400
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus 
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
 
 
bears the highest net tax burden. We therefore ran a scenario with the adjustment burden 
only on persons between 20 and 59 years old. The outcome can be taken as an 
indication of the intergenerational burden distribution when sustainability is achieved 
e.g. by increasing social security contributions. Graphs 3.4 to 3.6 show that the date 
after which newborns would prefer the early adjustment to the gradual strategy falls 
about a decade earlier for all three countries. Moreover, the difference between the two 
strategies increases for earlier-born cohorts. Nevertheless, the intergenerational 
distribution indicators depicted in table 3.2 indicate that the basic conclusion that early 
adjustment entails a more even distribution continues to hold. Indeed, all indicators 
except for the maximum burden for Belgium and Germany support this finding.  
Table 3.2: Intergenerational distribution indicators (adjustment burden on 



















   Women 69,500 71,800 14,300 18,400 21.8 26.9 87,400 80,800
   Men 66,000 70,600 13,800 18,800 23.2 29.9 78,800 74,900
Germany
   Women 58,000 60,900 30,100 31,400 25.6 26.6 144,300 143,700
   Men 54,300 57,100 27,000 28,400 26.5 27.8 125,600 125,000
France
   Women 59,900 82,600 18,600 31,400 17.5 28.6 127,700 135,800
   Men 55,900 82,300 17,200 29,900 20.4 34.1 102,700 112,500
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus 
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
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early adjustment (working age)
gradual adjustment (working age)
3.4 Belgium:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Men) 
of Cohort born in...
3.5 Germany:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Men) 
of Cohort born in...
3.6 France:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Women) 
of Cohort born in...































*   The lifetime net tax burden is defined as the present value over the lifetime of taxes paid to minus 
benefits (primary expenditure) received from the government. 
 
We also tested the robustness of our results with respect to the assumption of 
constant population size and structure after 2050. This assumption is clearly unrealistic. 
It would involve not only a sudden jump in fertility rates but also high migration for 
some age groups. As it turns out, explicitly forecasting the population after 2050 
actually reinforces our conclusions (see graphs 3.7 and 3.8 as well as table 3.3). For 
Germany, when the mortality, fertility and migration rates projected by the AWG for 
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2050 are also applied to the following years,
39 the early adjustment strategy is preferred 
according to all intergenerational distribution indicators. The true burden of the cohorts 
born between 1980 and 2040 is overestimated in the constant population scenario. For 
France, the changes are less pronounced but go in the same direction.
40  
Table 3.3: Intergenerational distribution indicators (with population forecast for 


















   Women 53,100 59,500 30,400 32,100 25.9 27.3 137,800 140,700
   Men 47,000 52,200 25,800 27,500 26.2 27.7 117,100 119,000
France
   Women 52,700 78,100 18,800 26,300 19.1 25.9 113,900 134,300
   Men 44,800 68,400 16,300 23,700 22.3 31.4 87,200 105,000
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus 
minimum burden*











































early adjustment with constant population after 2050
gradual adjustment with constant population after 2050
early adjustment with population forecast for years after 2050





































in euro in euro (2006)
3.7 Germany:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Men) 
of Cohort born in...
3.8 France:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Women) 




















*   The lifetime net tax burden is defined as the present value over the lifetime of taxes paid to minus 
benefits (primary expenditure) received from the government. 
 
                                                 
39  With the population forecast the overall population falls to 58.0 million and the dependency ratio to 
51.8% by 2100 compared to 75.4 million and 53.1% with a constant population. 
40  We did not run this exercise for Belgium.  
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As a third sensitivity test, instead of making net tax burdens of different cohorts 
comparable by adjusting for the increase in GDP per capita between the respective birth 
years, lifetime net tax rates can be calculated which show the relation between the 
present value of lifetime net tax payments and the present value of lifetime GDP per 
capita. The latter was calculated by discounting back to the year of birth GDP per capita 
observed over the lifetime taking into account survival probabilities. As shown for 
Germany, in this case the lines are smoother and the shapes also change somewhat. In 
the 1970s, the burden now increases for later-born cohorts while it falls in the baseline 
scenario (graph 3.9). This seems to be related to the negative interest growth differential 
that prevailed for many years of that decade and which distorts the picture somewhat in 
the baseline. Our basic conclusion, however, again remains untouched (table 3.4). 



















































Lifetime Net Tax Rate (Men) 
of Cohort born in...
 
*  Lifetime net tax rates show the relation between the present value of lifetime net tax payments and the 
present value of lifetime GDP per capita. 
 


















   Women 3.0 3.3 2.2 2.2 24.1 24.6 10.2 10.4
   Men 3.0 3.3 2.0 2.1 24.8 25.5 9.2 9.4
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus 
minimum burden*





The choice of the discount rate is a tricky question which has often been discussed 
in generational accounting studies.
41 In our baseline scenario we used the interest rate 
assumed by the AWG for future years for discounting (real interest rate of 3% and 
inflation of 2%). For the past we relied on the yield on long-term bonds issued by the 
respective government. Thus, the real discount rate is not constant over the whole 
period. As a first step towards a sensitivity analysis concerning the discount rate it was 
assumed that the real discount rate was constant from 1970 onwards at 3% while 
leaving past inflation untouched. In the result, cohorts’ burdens are roughly unchanged 
compared to the baseline, with the largest changes obviously arising for older cohorts, 
and lines for the two scenarios cross in the same year (see chart 3.10). Moreover, our 
basic conclusion again remains unchanged (table 3.5). The second step of the discount 
rate sensitivity analysis was to change the level of the constant discount rate to 5%.
42  









































early adjustment (constant d.r. 3%)





































early adjustment (constant d.r. 5%)
gradual adjustment (constant d.r. 5%)
early adjustment (constant d.r. 3%)
gradual adjustment (constant d.r. 3%)
in euro in euro
3.10 France:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Women) 
of Cohort born in...
3.11 France:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Women) 






















*   The lifetime net tax burden is defined as the present value over the lifetime of taxes paid to minus 
benefits (primary expenditure) received from the government. 
 
 
                                                 
41  See for example Accardo (1998) for France.  
42  This implies that for years after 2008 there is no identity anymore between the discount rate and the 
interest rate which is used to calculate the government interest burden. 
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   Women 42,600 68,600 15,900 24,000 15.5 22.9 116,000 134,900
   Men 43,000 68,800 15,900 23,900 20.3 29.9 91,500 109,400
constant d.r. 5%
   Women 34,200 48,600 12,900 16,900 14.7 19.4 99,100 109,600
   Men 34,300 48,600 13,000 17,000 15.7 20.6 94,400 104,800
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus 
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
 
This leads to two conclusions. First, cohorts’ burden is now lower than in the 
baseline scenario (or the ‘constant 3% scenario’), especially for cohorts born after the 
1990s. Thus, assuming a higher discount rate gives the impression that intergenerational 
distribution is more even (see the direct comparison of the coefficient of variation with 
3% and 5% in table 3.5). The second and more important conclusion is that when we 
assume a constant 5% discount rate the lines cross more or less at the same time as in 
the baseline scenario (2023 vs. 2016) and early adjustment still entails a more even 
distribution (see chart 3.11 and table 3.5). 
Finally, a first small step towards the outcome of a fully-fledged generational 
accounting exercise can be taken by distributing the burden of the sum of all budget 
categories not considered to be age-specific by the AWG to persons aged between 20 
and 99 years in the scenario with an explicit population forecast for the years after 2050. 
With the impact of old-age expenditure like pensions, health and long-term care and 
education for the young determined separately, this is more in line with the age-profiles 
obtained in generational accounting studies. In this scenario the results change 
substantially, as illustrated by the case of Germany (chart 3.12). The overall burden is 
much lower now, backing our earlier note of caution on the reliability of absolute 
numbers. Moreover, the pattern over cohorts also changes somewhat. The increase for 
cohorts born after 1980 ends earlier and is significantly less steep. Moreover, the 
crossing of the lines for early and gradual adjustment occurs almost two decades earlier. 





Graph 3.12: Intergenerational distribution (budget categories assumed to be non-
ageing-related by AWG allocated to persons aged 20-99, with population forecast 






































early adjustment (with population forecast)
gradual adjustment (with population forecast)
in euro
3.12 Germany:
Lifetime Net Tax Burden (Men) 








*   The lifetime net tax burden is defined as the present value over the lifetime of taxes paid to minus 
benefits (primary expenditure) received from the government. 
 
 
Table 3.6: Intergenerational distribution indicators (budget categories assumed to 
be non-ageing-related by AWG allocated to persons aged 20-99, with population 


















   Women 21,700 27,100 10,600 12,100 26.6 29.0 47,700 52,000
   Men 13,800 19,100 5,600 7,100 29.7 34.5 23,000 27,100
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus 
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
 
Overall, the conclusions derived under the baseline scenario seem to be quite 
robust with respect to a variety of conceivable variations in underlying parameters and 
assumptions. From the perspective of intergenerational burden distribution, a rapid 
adjustment of the primary balance to a sustainable level seems to be preferable to a 
more gradual approach. Nevertheless, care needs to be exercised when interpreting the 
results. Data restrictions only allowed us to compare cohorts born since 1970. So a 
41 
 
substantial part of the living population could not be included in the analysis.
43 
Moreover, even for this period the underlying data are sometimes of poor quality or had 
to be estimated. Finally, whether a specific intergenerational distribution is preferred 
depends on normative presumptions that could be questioned. 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper we analyse (budgetary policy responses to) fiscal sustainability 
against the backdrop of population ageing. With respect to the budgetary costs of 
ageing, the projections carried out by the AWG, which was established within the EU's 
Economic Policy Committee, can be considered as an important reference point. In its 
2006 report (EPC and EC, 2006) the AWG estimates, on the basis of a scenario taken as 
a reference, that ageing-related changes in five specific expenditure categories – 
pensions, health care, long-term care, unemployment and education – can work out at an 
increase of the expenditure ratio of slightly more than 4% of GDP for the EU and close 
to 4.5% of GDP for the euro area
44 in the 2010-2050 period. However, such long-term 
projections typically come with a very large degree of uncertainty.  
After a detailed assessment of the projections for the ageing-related expenditure 
increases for individual countries, we illustrate the upside risks to the AWG's headline 
projections via a harmonised mechanical exercise that is mainly based upon the 
sensitivities reported for alternative scenarios considered by the AWG. This exercise 
incorporates, if applicable, more recent estimates for the further increase in life 
expectancy by 2050; assumes that the income elasticity of health care expenditure 
would remain constant at 1.1 throughout the projection period rather than converge to 1 
by 2050 as in the AWG headline scenario; and takes into account an increasing 
importance of the formal sector in the provision of elderly care due to changing family 
structures and rising female participation rates. It shows, in particular, that plausible 
alternative assumptions on key parameters in the projections could significantly 
increase the AWG estimates of ageing-related increases in government expenditure in 
the 2010-2050 period. 
                                                 
43  These cohorts might be expected to be less affected by the budgetary consequences of demographic 
ageing. However, an extension to cohorts born since 1960 for France had little impact on the results. 
44  As the Report was published in the beginning of 2006 the EU excludes Romania and Bulgaria while 
the euro area excludes Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. 
42 
 
We consider a number of quantitative sustainability indicators to assess the 
sustainability of public finances in euro area countries against the backdrop of 
population ageing. While there is no clear-cut theoretical benchmark for fiscal 
sustainability, the 'conventional wisdom' is that continuously rising and/or extremely 
high debt ratios are unsustainable. Hence, in practice, quantitative indicators of 
sustainability gaps typically attempt to measure the fiscal effort required by a certain 
date to bring the debt ratio back to a sustainable path or level taking into account the 
projected budgetary impact of ageing and a set of assumptions (e.g. concerning the 
macroeconomic environment, the implicit interest rate on public debt and deficit-debt 
adjustments). We argue that the two quantitative indicators that are routinely considered 
by the EC (and that impose a 60% and a stable debt ratio by 2050 respectively) may be 
complemented by other indicators, e.g. imposing a balanced budget by 2050. 
While the exact numbers may differ significantly depending on the sustainability 
indicator used, the ranking of the countries on the basis of their sustainability gaps is 
relatively robust. Countries that currently record high fiscal surpluses (e.g. Finland) or 
have undertaken more important structural reforms to their pensions systems (e.g. 
Germany, Austria and Italy) tend to experience lower sustainability risks. All indicators 
confirm that, of the countries considered here (the euro area minus Slovenia, Malta and 
Cyprus), public finances are currently only sustainable in Finland. All other countries 
will have to adjust their fiscal policies sooner or later. 
Quantitative sustainability indicators such as those considered in this paper 
typically measure the size of a relatively 'early' adjustment effort aimed at closing the 
sustainability gap. However, this should not be interpreted as a policy recommendation: 
the indicators do not imply anything about the appropriateness of such an early 
adjustment effort to restore fiscal sustainability compared to e.g. that of a more gradual 
approach. In this connection, it should be stressed that, for many countries, 
implementing such an early adjustment effort would lead to high surpluses in the 
coming years and a rapid reduction of public debt ratios (and, in some cases, the 
building up of net financial asset positions). 
The appropriateness of any specific budgetary strategy needs to be assessed on the 
basis of pre-defined criteria. If intergenerational equity is considered to be a relevant 
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criterion in this respect, generational accounts or, more specifically, the total lifetime 
contribution of generations born in different years to the government’s primary balance 
may be an important indicator to assess the relative merits of alternative budgetary 
strategies. In this connection, the intergenerational implications of an 'early' adjustment 
strategy (an increase in the primary balance by 2015 that is sufficient to absorb the 
ageing costs and still end up with a balanced budget in 2050) are compared to those of a 
corresponding 'gradual' approach (that spreads out the fiscal adjustment over the whole 
2008-2050 period) for three countries – Belgium, France and Germany – in this paper. 
A number of tentative conclusions can be drawn from the evolution of the total 
lifetime burden in this empirical exercise. First, a gradual adjustment is typically more 
favourable for older generations than for generations born after a certain date. Second, 
this date falls later, i.e. generations that are worse off under the gradual strategy are 
further away in the future if all generations contribute to the fiscal adjustment than if 
only generations of working age do. Third, the ‘early’ adjustment strategy, implying 
significant government surpluses in the coming years for the three countries considered, 
generally leads to flatter time profiles of the total lifetime burden – and, hence, may be 
considered more equitable – than the ‘gradual’ fiscal adjustment. 
While these findings have to be interpreted with caution, not least due to data 
limitations, they are of particular relevance for the aforementioned upcoming revision of 
the medium-term objectives for fiscal policy defined in the context of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. If intergenerational equity is considered to be an important guiding 
principle in this respect, it could be made operational along the lines suggested above. If 
our tentative results were confirmed, e.g. with a more complete dataset, and if no further 
cost-cutting reforms to pensions and care systems are implemented, an upward revision 
of these medium-term objectives to significant surpluses may then be warranted for 
many EU Member States. 
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Annex: Fiche on AWG projections for Germany 
1. General description 
The latest AWG projections for Germany are based on a demographic scenario 
which implies a limited decline in the overall population of 6.5% between 2010 and 
2050. However, the age structure will change dramatically with the dependency ratio 
increasing from 30.7% to 51.7%. The population of working age will shrink by 18.0%, 
while the elderly population will increase by 37.9%. However, the assumed increase in 
participation rates and the fall in structural unemployment will limit the decline in the 
number of employed persons to 13.4%. Overall, potential GDP growth should slow 
down from 1.7% to 1.2% per year despite an expected increase in labour productivity. 
It is projected that the ratio of ageing-related expenditure to GDP will increase by 
3.9 percentage points between 2010 and 2050, about the average for the EU and the 
euro area. While pension, health care and long-term care expenditure will increase by 
2.6 percentage points, 0.9 percentage point and 1.0 percentage point respectively, 
expenditure for unemployment benefits and education is actually expected to fall by 0.2 
and 0.3 percentage point.  
2. Comparison with alternative projections and risk assessment 
In order to assess the sensitivity and reliability of the results obtained by the 
AWG, the underlying assumptions as well as the outcome are compared with other 
available studies, especially a national study conducted by the Ifo Institute.
45 With 
regard to the underlying demographic development, the projection employed by the 
AWG assumes a slower increase in life expectancy than the latest official population 
projection by the Federal Statistical Office.
46 This seems to be one of the main reasons 
why the AWG scenario shows a significantly lower dependency ratio in 2050. 
According to a sensitivity test performed by the AWG, a further increase in life 
                                                 
45 See M. Werding and A. Kaltschütz (2005), Modellrechnungen zur langfristigen Tragfähigkeit der 
öffentlichen Finanzen, ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, Munich. 
46 Benefiting from higher net migration assumptions for the initial years, total population nevertheless is 
higher in the AWG scenario. See Statistisches Bundesamt (2006), Bevölkerung Deutschlands bis 2050, 
Wiesbaden. Reference is made here to the 1-W2 variant. The Ifo study is based on an older projection 
by the Federal Statistical Office. 
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expectancy at birth by 1.6 years for men and 1.3 years for women between 2010 and 
2050 – which would largely match the Federal Statistical Office’s assumptions – would 
imply an additional increase in ageing-related expenditure of approximately 0.5 
percentage point in 2050 (0.2 percentage point for pensions, 0.2 percentage point for 
health care and 0.1 percentage point for long-term care). Even this scenario might still 
underestimate the decline in mortality rates as it implies an increase in life expectancy 
which is considerably lower than the almost linear increase of 2½ months per year 
observed in past decades. Moreover, there is a risk that net migration, which is 
anticipated to alleviate the decline in the population, might turn out to be considerably 
lower than expected. 
Concerning  macroeconomic assumptions, the AWG projections regarding the 
participation rate are similar to those in the Ifo study with a somewhat higher starting 
level assumed for 2010 being offset by a slower increase afterwards. In any case, the 
impact of changes in the assumed employment rate on pension expenditure would be 
limited, according to the sensitivity analyses performed by the AWG.
47 Labour 
productivity is anticipated to grow at a similar rate in both studies. The baseline 
assumptions on unemployment by the Ifo study deviate markedly from those by the 
AWG. However, the Ifo study authors themselves regard the baseline assumption, 
which is taken from a report by the Rürup Commission, as being potentially too 
optimistic. In their risk scenario, they therefore use a long-term unemployment rate 
quite similar to that used by the AWG. 
Turning to individual expenditure items, the increase in pension expenditure 
between 2010 and 2050 projected in the Ifo study (3.0 percentage points) is slightly 
higher than the increase in the AWG reference scenario. Numerous differences in the 
assumptions and the methodology of the two studies make it difficult, however, to trace 
the driving factors behind this discrepancy. Disregarding convergence of currently 
comparatively high pensions in East Germany to western levels as in the Ifo study 
should, for example, lead to an upward bias for pension expenditure increases. Risks 
                                                 
47 With a lower employment rate, GDP would be lower than in the baseline, but pension expenditure 
would also be dampened in the long run as fewer people would accrue pension rights. Moreover, the 
sustainability factor included in the pension adjustment formula leads to lower pension increases if 
employment falls. The effect of lower employment on other ageing-related expenditure has not been 
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related to already enacted legislation changes not taken into account in the AWG 
calculations appear to be slightly on the downward side, according to the current 
perspective. A gradual increase in the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 by the year 
2029 – subject to a possible revision in future years – has now been enacted. This could 
lower pension expenditure by roughly ¼% of GDP in 2050.
48 While the assumption that 
the dampening factors built into the pension adjustment formula would always be 
effective and never subject to escape clauses presented a clear upward risk to the AWG 
expenditure projections at the time, legislation has now been enacted which ensures that 
any skipped adjustment will be made up for in later years.  
Concerning health care and long-term care expenditure, non-ageing-related cost 
drivers can potentially play a large role in the future trend. Scenarios and sensitivity 
analyses performed by the AWG itself as well as in the Ifo study and by the OECD
49 
suggest substantial uncertainty in this respect. In the AWG reference scenario, the 
increase in the health expenditure ratio (without the special scheme for civil servants) 
projected by the AWG for the 2005 to 2050 period is 0.6 percentage point and 0.5 
percentage point lower than the increases anticipated by the OECD (cost containment 
scenario) and the Ifo study respectively. In the AWG reference scenario, an income 
elasticity of demand of 1.1 in the base year is assumed, converging to 1 in 2050. If 
income elasticity were to remain at 1.1 over the whole projection period, the increase in 
health expenditure would rise by 0.3 percentage point to 1.2 percentage points over the 
2010-2050 period in the AWG projections.
50 The health reform of 2006, which has not 
been taken into account in the latest AWG calculations, will probably not have a 
pronounced effect on long-term expenditure developments. 
For  long-term care, the expenditure increase in the OECD projections is 0.2 
percentage point higher than in the AWG reference scenario while there is almost no 
                                                                                                                                               
calculated by the AWG. The results of the risk variant of the Ifo study nevertheless suggest limited 
effects. 
48 This estimate is based on policy simulations of an increase in the legal retirement age included in the 
November 2006 pension insurance report (Rentenversicherungsbericht), the Ifo study (additionally 
taking into account agreed exemptions) and calculations in German Council of Economic Experts, 
Jahresgutachten 2007/2008, p 180. 
49 See J. Oliveira Martins, C. de la Maisonneuve, and S. Bjornerud, “Projections of OECD health and 
long-term care public expenditures”, in Banca d’Italia (ed.), Fiscal Indicators, 2006. No figures are 
provided for 2010. 
50 This increase is approximated by adding the difference between the increase in the AWG’s positive 
income elasticity of demand and pure ageing scenario to the AWG’s reference scenario. 
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difference with respect to the Ifo study. A shift towards more formal long-term care 
would imply an increase in expenditure of 1.4 percentage points (2010-2050) according 
to AWG figures
51 and of 2.2 percentage points (2005-2050) according to the OECD’s 
“increased participation” scenario compared to 1.0 percentage point in the AWG 
baseline. While the AWG calculations are based on a dynamic increase in long-term 
care expenditure per nursing case, unit costs so far were nominally fixed by law. 
However, legislation raising benefits has recently being enacted. In any case, it appears 
unlikely that expenditure per nursing case will remain unchanged until 2050.  
3. Conclusions 
All in all, a cautious alternative headline estimate for the increase in ageing costs 
may be obtained by adjusting the assumption on future life expectancy in the AWG 
reference scenario to that in the AWG high life-expectancy scenario. Health expenditure 
projections could be further adjusted to reflect a constant income elasticity of demand of 
1.1. This also suggests an increase in health expenditure that is more in line with 
alternative studies. For long-term care expenditure, the AWG’s increase in formal care 
assumption could be adopted. On the other hand, the estimated increase in pension 
expenditure could be reduced to take account of recent legislation changes. Adjusted in 
this way, the increase in the ageing-related expenditure ratio would amount to some 4.8 
percentage points in the 2010-2050 period.  
                                                 
51 This rise is approximated by adding the difference between the increase in the AWG’s ‘increase in 
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